Below is an English version of the recent interview with Armina G. Margaryan, the WGSA Founder & President, on armtimes.com: https://armtimes.com/hy/article/301013
At the last Q&A session with the Government in the National Assembly, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan expressed his appreciation about the meeting with Ilham Aliyev, the President of Azerbaijan which took place within the framework of the BRICS summit. Prime Minister of Armenia emphasized that they hadn’t had such a long conversation for a long time, or they did not have it at all.
According to the head of the Government, the most important thought of the meeting was that “Armenia and Azerbaijan need not only a peace treaty and various treaties for peaceful coexistence and peaceful existence, but, in my opinion, they also need to conclude a strategic deal on within what resolutions as an independent state we are going to live side by side in upcoming centuries.”
According to you, what does the Prime Minister mean when he says, “strategic deal with Azerbaijan”?
It is not a secret that due to the maximalist position of Azerbaijan, questions of strategic importance are gradually, completely or partially being excluded from the text of the peace treaty. In this context, Azerbaijan pursues two strategic goals. The first strategic objective is to derail the signing of the peace treaty as a whole: This is the maximum plan of Azerbaijan, since it is aimed not only at “surrendering” Armenia, but also at ensuring the longevity of the regime based on the conflict persistence. This option is the most dangerous for Armenia, since it will contribute to the continuation of the conflict while hindering the normalization of Armenia – Türkiye relations, the prospects of a physical unblocking of Armenia, reduction of the economic and political dependence of Armenia on Russia, the process of strengthening Armenia`s resilience through the support of the US and the EU. The Armenian side consistently tries to hinder the realization of this strategic goal of Azerbaijan, using such tools as showing maximum flexibility in negotiations, unilateral concessions on certain issues, positioning itself in the international community as a constructive party, periodically putting its constructive positions on the agenda in different forms.
Azerbaijan’s second strategic goal is to make the text of a potential peace treaty as less substantive as possible, so that after its signing, throughout years issues of vital importance for co-existence will be resolved exclusively in favor of its national security interests and through using its preferable tools: In this case, we are dealing with the Azerbaijani tactics aimed at implementing the policy of so-called “capitulation”, exhaustion and absorption of Armenia. It is quite clear that this strategic goal also is not favorable for Armenia as its ultimate goal is not to create conditions for peaceful and coexistence in dignity with Armenia. Meanwhile, this option could at least allow to partially or completely unblock Armenia in the medium term and, in the long term, gradually transform the conflict.
I see the Prime Minister’s statement on the conclusion of a strategic deal with Azerbaijan through this perspective.
Considering and proposing the process of “transforming the conflict” as an “Armenia–Azerbaijan strategic deal” actually means that the Armenian side does not consider the signing of the treaty as the final result but emphasizes that the following processes should promote or hinder peaceful and dignified coexistence between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
If Armenia manages to efficiently develop the concept of a “strategic deal” and promote it as a foreign policy agenda using hybrid tactics, then both Armenia and Azerbaijan will be equally responsible for its success or failure. As an idea, it is good, but how much it is applicable depends on internal and external factors.
Will Azerbaijan agree to a strategic deal with Armenia and in what specific circumstances?
It is obvious that the strategic deal we picture contradicts the strategic goals of Azerbaijan. I think it is more realistic that the Aliyev regime will continue using the time to its advantage to get the maximum from Armenia at the appropriate moment by force or with the intention of narrowing the circle around Armenia through “anti-Western regionalization” processes. Azerbaijan will enter into a strategic deal with Armenia aimed at creating peaceful and dignified coexistence in one case only: namely, if such a deal becomes inevitable. And for this to become inevitable, we must continue fulfilling our homework: considering security as holistic simultaneously we must introduce comprehensive security as a governing model, diversify our economy and foreign policy.
Both our and Azerbaijani Foreign Ministers have separately stated that we are very close to finalizing the peace treaty and that negotiations will enter a new phase since this December. What to expect from the so-called “new round” and do you consider it possible to reach a peace agreement with Azerbaijan and the strategic deal mentioned by the Prime Minister in the context of the reshuffle in the US administration after the elections?
Your question relates to external factors, which are perhaps the most difficult to calculate.
There are many ”ifs” here. However, having positive signals both the Armenian and the Azerbaijani sides are opening the opportunity to work, including in the context of the new US administration’s policy in the South Caucasus. At the same time, even if the Peace Treaty is signed, we still need to be able to define the “strategic deal” concept, make it attractive to various power centers, and implement pro-Armenian political agendas that contribute to its realization. I would not expect any tangible results in the near future. My take is we will deal with repackaging of old agendas from both sides.