A Historic Turning Point in the South Caucasus

By Elen Hokhikyan, WGSA Associate Expert

In a landmark ceremony at the White House, personally mediated by U.S. President Donald Trump, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev took an unprecedented step toward ending decades of hostilities. The two leaders signed a joint peace declaration committing to a permanent cessation of hostilities, the establishment of diplomatic relations, and mutual recognition of sovereignty and territorial integrity. On the same day, Foreign Ministers Ararat Mirzoyan and Jeyhun Bayramov initialed a draft “Agreement on Peace and Establishment of Interstate Relations”, a 17-article treaty laying the framework for comprehensive normalization.

The agreements also formalized the dissolution of the OSCE Minsk Group—the long-standing mediation body sidelined by Baku after the 2020 war—and introduced an ambitious new initiative: the “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity” (TRIPP), a 43-kilometer transit route linking Azerbaijan to its Nakhchivan exclave through Armenian territory with reciprocal benefits for international and intra-state connectivity for Armenia. This route will be managed by a joint Armenian-American consortium under exclusive U.S. development rights for 99 years, positioning TRIPP as a key project for trade and transport between Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the wider region. Crucially, it will operate under Armenia’s jurisdiction, fully respecting its sovereignty, and is designed for mutual benefit.

This momentous occasion—uniting leaders of two nations long separated by war and entrenched grievances—marks a profound shift not only for the South Caucasus but for the wider geopolitical landscape. For more than three decades, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict defied resolution despite repeated international mediation, largely under the auspices of the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairmanship. Throughout this period, Russia positioned itself as Armenia’s strategic ally and the region’s principal power broker, yet often appeared more invested in preserving the status quo than fostering a genuine settlement, leveraging the unresolved conflict to maintain influence.

The Washington summit signals a reorientation of influence in a region long contested by global and regional powers. That the declaration was signed in Washington rather than Moscow is itself symbolic, marking a shift in the balance of power and the United States’ renewed engagement in a strategically vital area. The South Caucasus sits at the intersection of critical geopolitical fault lines: Armenia serves as the only land bridge between Russia’s North Caucasus and the Middle East and is a crossroads for historic trade routes and modern energy transit. For Moscow, Armenia has long functioned as a southern security buffer against NATO’s eastern flank; for Washington, a Western-aligned Armenia disrupts Russia’s hold on the region and positions U.S. influence between Turkey and Iran. Azerbaijan, meanwhile, is a key gateway to Central Asia, described by Zbigniew Brzezinski as a “critically important geopolitical pivot” whose loss to Russian control would undermine Central Asian independence.

Against this backdrop, the Washington agreement carries weight far beyond bilateral peace. It is a strategic move in the broader contest over Eurasia’s future, with the potential to alter regional dynamics, open new economic corridors, and provide Armenia with a pathway out of the blockade that has constrained it since independence. While the full implications will unfold over time, the framework already offers a historic opportunity for stability, cooperation, and economic growth in the South Caucasus.

Main Benefits for Armenia

One of the most significant and immediate benefits of the recently signed U.S.-mediated declaration is the almost complete elimination of the risk of an Azerbaijani invasion into Armenia’s sovereign territory – a threat that, according to some accounts, had been dangerously imminent earlier this year. This is especially notable given that, in 2021 and 2022, approximately 200 square kilometers of Armenia’s territory were occupied during Azerbaijani incursions, carried out while Russia ignored its treaty obligations and security commitments to Armenia. The stability guaranteed by the Washington summit outcomes fundamentally alters the strategic dynamics of the South Caucasus. It deprives Russia of one of its most potent tools of influence over Armenia: the ability to manipulate Azerbaijan as a “Damocles’ sword,” ready to be unleashed against Yerevan whenever the Kremlin sought to pressure it into political concessions.

Since the 2020 Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, Armenia had been trapped in a debilitating “no-peace-no-war” deadlock. This ambiguity allowed Moscow to present itself as both guarantor of Armenia’s security and gatekeeper of regional stability, while simultaneously maintaining close coordination with Baku. Whenever it suited its geopolitical agenda, Russia could encourage or turn a blind eye to Azerbaijani provocations, forcing Armenia to make unwelcome compromises. A key example was the Azerbaijan’s insistence, in concert with Kremlin, on establishing the so-called “Zangezur Corridor” – an extraterritorial passage through Armenia’s Syunik Province that would have severed the Armenian-Iranian border and left Armenia entirely dependent on Russia-controlled transit routes. In a similar vein, in August 2022 Russia’s border guard service sought permission to fence off a 42-kilometer stretch along the Araks River, effectively placing Armenia’s only border with Iran under Russian control – a move thwarted only by the intervention of Armenian security services.

That scenario is now decisively off the table. The language of the new declaration makes clear that the “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity” (TRIPP) will operate under Armenia’s jurisdiction, fully respecting the country’s sovereignty, and will function on the basis of mutual benefit for both Armenia and Azerbaijan. By enshrining these terms in an internationally witnessed, U.S.-mediated document, the agreement removes the legal and political foundation for any future talk of extraterritorial corridors and makes it far harder for any actor – including Russia – to undermine it.

This is a profound reversal of the manipulative strategy Russia has used for decades. The pattern was most clearly seen in 2013, when security concerns and the specter of Azerbaijani aggression were used to push then-President Serzh Sargsyan to abandon the nearly completed EU Association Agreement. The threat of war – real or manufactured – was a lever Moscow could pull at will. It worked flawlessly right up to 2023, when ethnic cleansing was carried out in Nagorno-Karabakh in the silent presence of Russian “peacekeepers. Azerbaijan’s closure of the Lachin Corridor for almost a year was a key instrument in this operation, effectively forcing more than 120,000 Armenians to leave Artsakh and seek refuge in Armenia. In the aftermath, Moscow appeared poised to use this humanitarian crisis to further entrench its control over Armenia. Now, with the latest Washington arrangements firmly at hand, the Kremlin has lost that leverage. It no longer has either the capacity or the political space to dictate terms to Armenia through the threat of Azerbaijani military action.

The security dividend of this development cannot be overstated. For the first time in decades, Armenians can imagine a future without the constant fear of another war erupting on their borders. Families who had lived under the shadow of 2020’s devastation – which claimed 3,825 Armenian servicemen, left 187 missing, and took the lives of more than 80 civilians – can now breathe more freely. For parents, the prospect of their sons reaching the age of conscription has long been a source of dread, not because of military service itself, but because of the all-too-real possibility that a new round of fighting could send them to the frontlines of a war Armenia might not survive. With the immediate threat removed, that fear begins to dissipate, replaced by the far more constructive challenge of preparing the next generation for opportunities in a time of peace.

Those opportunities are real and tangible. The declaration and accompanying agreements signed in Washington open the door to substantial U.S. investment in Armenia’s technology sector, capacity building, and infrastructure. These initiatives are not abstract pledges; they represent the creation of new, high-value jobs, the introduction of advanced skills training, and the fostering of an innovation-friendly business climate. For young Armenians – many of whom have looked abroad for opportunity – this could be the first credible reason in years to envision building their careers and futures at home.

The benefits extend beyond the technology sector. The opening of regional routes and the broader de-blockading of the South Caucasus will have a multiplier effect on Armenia’s economy. By reconnecting Armenia to regional and global markets, these corridors reduce transportation costs, attract foreign investment, and integrate the country into supply chains that had been closed to it for decades. Politically, the ability to trade, travel, and collaborate with neighbors without Russian mediation strengthens Armenia’s sovereignty and bargaining position. Economically, the stability such projects generate can, in some cases, act as a more durable security guarantee than military alliances.

What Azerbaijan Received

Some argue that Azerbaijan received more, or rather everything, in comparison with Armenia. The Section 907 provision of the 1992 Freedom Support Act, which prohibited direct U.S. government assistance to Azerbaijan in response to its blockade on Armenia during the first Nagorno-Karabakh war, will be suspended for good, as President Trump announced – although this restriction was being waived every year since 2002. Aliyev has also mentioned the new opportunity of strengthening ties with America and even a possible new strategic partnership agreement in the upcoming months.

However, considering the long-standing U.S. concerns over Azerbaijan’s governance, human rights record, and overall reliability as an ally, as well as the strict limitations under ITAR and U.S. export control regulations when it comes to sharing sensitive defense and dual-use technologies, such a transformation into a “trusted partner” for high-tech or military trade is far from imminent. These frameworks impose rigorous checks, and countries with a track record of authoritarian rule, suppression of dissent, and inconsistent alignment with U.S. strategic interests face significant barriers before entering into advanced defense or technology cooperation with Washington.

In contrast, Armenia has never been subject to such bans on direct U.S. assistance and is now positioned to receive substantial U.S. investments, not only in the technology sector but across multiple strategic industries. This opens the path for Armenia to upgrade from a “D” category country under U.S. export control classifications to a “B” category nation -effectively becoming a trusted partner for trade in sensitive high-tech and defense products in the future. This status shift would represent not just an economic opportunity but a strategic realignment, enabling Armenia to integrate more deeply into Western security and innovation networks, while reinforcing its long-term partnership with the United States.

For Aliyev personally, the symbolism of the moment was no less valuable than the policy substance. Standing in the Oval Office – “the most important office in the world,” as he called it – and signing a joint declaration with the President of the United States was an act heavy with political theatre. For a leader widely regarded in the West as authoritarian, whose government has faced international criticism over its treatment of opposition figures and curbs on free speech, this was a stage few believed he could share even months ago. Yet here he was, not only at the table but visibly embraced by Washington as a partner in a U.S.-brokered regional peace. The domestic and international public relations impact of this moment will echo far beyond the day’s headlines.

This comes at a time when Azerbaijan finds itself in an increasingly tense standoff with Moscow, especially over the treatment of naturalized Russian citizens of Azerbaijani origin. The Washington declaration and the warmth with which Aliyev was received sends a clear message that Baku has other great-power options and is capable of pivoting westward when its strategic interests align. Pledging to honor the peace agreement “forever” was more than diplomatic flourish; it was a tacit acknowledgment that the political capital invested in this U.S.-led process is too valuable to squander.

However, in evaluating these developments, it is important to recognize that Armenia and Azerbaijan entered this process from profoundly different starting points. Armenia came into the Washington summit as the clear military loser of the 2020 war, facing the existential risk of losing Syunik province to a proposed Russia – Azerbaijan extraterritorial corridor – the so-called “Zangezour Corridor”. Such a scenario would have left Armenia completely landlocked, economically dependent, and politically subjugated to Russian interests, with some analysts warning that it could eventually lead to Armenia’s de facto absorption by Russia.

In resisting this bleak trajectory, Armenia has paid an immense price. The loss of Artsakh and the forced displacement of its entire Armenian population will remain a national trauma for generations. Yet the outcome of the Washington summit has, for the first time in five years, given Armenians the ability to imagine a future not dominated by the threat of renewed war.

Risks, Uncertainties, and Possible Safeguards

Undoubtedly, Russia emerges as the biggest loser in this geopolitical shift. For more than two centuries, Moscow had been building and fiercely guarding its architecture of influence in the South Caucasus, claiming an exclusive sphere of control both before and after the Soviet collapse. To sustain this dominance, Russia actively engineered and managed regional conflicts, most notably by assigning the historically Armenian-populated region of Nagorno-Karabakh to Soviet Azerbaijan in the early 1920s, creating a frozen fault line it could manipulate for leverage.

That long-cultivated system collapsed with startling speed. Today, Russia has been completely sidelined from decisions over new transit routes in the region, holds no meaningful veto over trade corridors, and has relinquished its military foothold in Nagorno-Karabakh – a presence it expected to maintain indefinitely after deploying “peacekeepers” in 2020. Instead of cementing its role, Moscow’s intervention only hastened its irrelevance. In the process, it betrayed Armenia, its nominal strategic ally, by failing to prevent Azerbaijan’s final takeover of Artsakh and by tacitly refusing to formally accept that Armenia proper’s territories were occupied by Azerbaijan. In doing so, Russia cited the lack of formally delimited borders, despite possessing Soviet-era maps clearly showing the boundaries of Soviet Armenia, highlighting that its refusal was more a matter of political convenience than legal uncertainty. This loss is not merely territorial or diplomatic; it is structural – stripping Russia of the very levers it had used to dominate the South Caucasus for generations.

In light of everything discussed above, Russia will not accept its loss of influence in the South Caucasus without a fight. Having been entirely excluded from the regional de-blockading processes and the planned opening of transit routes – which are now being developed under U.S. auspices rather than Moscow’s control – Russia has intensified hybrid operations in Armenia. These efforts exploit pro-Russian political factions, media networks, and covert agents of influence to destabilize the government and challenge Armenia’s westward trajectory. With the 2026 elections approaching, these efforts are likely to escalate, and if the pro-Russian opposition succeeds, Armenia’s turn toward the West and the sovereignty it seeks to protect could be reversed overnight. To counter this, Armenia must move quickly to fortify its democratic institutions and sharpen its defenses against foreign interference. Bolstering cyber security, expanding media literacy programs, and exposing influence operations before they gain momentum will be essential. Western partners, particularly the EU and U.S., can support this by providing targeted assistance to Armenia’s security services, enhancing election monitoring, and scaling up anti-disinformation efforts ahead of the vote.

Practical security concerns are equally pressing. The reopening of regional transport routes means Armenians could find themselves traveling through Azerbaijani territory. Yet decades of animosity, combined with recent statements from Baku signaling reluctance to host Armenian travelers, make the safety of such crossings far from guaranteed. Without credible, enforceable safeguards, these routes risk becoming flashpoints rather than pathways to reconciliation.

There is also the risk of strategic imbalance. While Azerbaijan stands to gain from eased U.S. export restrictions, Armenia – though eligible for direct U.S. assistance – still faces a lengthy process before new trade, defense, and technology arrangements with Washington fully take effect and start delivering tangible benefits.

This delay could create asymmetries in high-tech and military cooperation, undermining the fragile balance created by the peace deal. To close this gap, Yerevan should accelerate integration into Western trade and defense frameworks by fast-tracking export control upgrades, expanding joint military exercises, and opening new channels for technology transfer. Such measures would not only level the playing field with Azerbaijan but also signal to both Baku and Moscow that Armenia’s Westward trajectory has firm, long-term backing.

In conclusion, the Washington arrangements and the prospective opening of regional routes mark a historic milestone for Armenia. For the first time since independence – and after decades of blockade, when 70 percent of its borders with Azerbaijan and Turkey were sealed – Yerevan has the chance to reconnect with the wider region on its own terms. Freed from sole reliance on Georgia and heavily sanctioned Iran for access to global markets, Armenia can begin to diversify its trade, attract new investment, and reorient its economy toward growth. With the initialing the peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan, the long-anticipated reopening of Armenia’s border with Turkey is now expected in the near future, fulfilling a key condition that Ankara has consistently tied to regional normalization. While challenges remain, these developments open doors that have been shut since the early 1990s, offering Armenia a unique opportunity to reduce its dependence on Russia, strengthen its sovereignty, and take meaningful steps toward a more secure and prosperous future.