By Ellen Hokhikyan, WGSA Associate Expert
The current institutional opposition in Armenia has failed to grasp a simple truth since losing power in 2018: the only path to political revival, and the only conceivable way to regain authority from Armenian citizens – is through a frank acknowledgment of the errors it committed over decades, a sincere request for forgiveness from the people, and a demonstrated commitment to placing the public interest above personal and foreign agendas (Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018).
Instead, they have chosen the well-trodden path of denial and division that authoritarian movements often take when stripped of power. Rather than acknowledging their mistakes, they have sought to rewrite history, treating citizens with contempt while refusing to take responsibility for the corruption, institutional decay, and geopolitical vulnerability that unfolded under their rule. They have unleashed aggressive misinformation campaigns, sowing fear and confusion while labeling dissenting citizens as traitors or fools, deepening polarization to fracture society enough to claw their way back to relevance (Tucker et al., 2017).
But this strategy is nothing new. Throughout their years in power, these opposition forces were notorious for systematic electoral fraud and intimidation, manipulating elections to maintain a grip on authority they could never truly earn at the ballot box (OSCE/ODIHR, 2008; Nichol, 2011). The 2018 revolution laid bare this reality: when Armenians were finally able to vote freely, these once “invincible” parties could not secure a single seat in parliament, exposing their previous “landslide victories” as illusions built on coercion and fraud.
Now, stripped of old levers of coercion, they return to the tools they know best: misinformation, external patronage, and fearmongering. Instead of rebuilding trust with the Armenian public, they once again look outward, seeking Moscow’s endorsement, hoping foreign blessing can substitute for domestic legitimacy. This is a familiar pattern in post-Soviet contexts, where elites sacrifice sovereignty and popular will in pursuit of personal power (Hale, 2015).
Yet history, both globally and within Armenia, demonstrates that power regained through foreign favor rather than earned through accountability is fleeting and corrosive. The Bourbon Restoration in France collapsed despite foreign support as popular rejection grew (Broers, 2014). The Shah’s return in Iran in 1953, backed by external intervention, only fueled resentment, leading to the revolution of 1979 (Kinzer, 2003). In each case, foreign-backed returns to power failed because they ignored the legitimacy that can only come from the people.
The Armenian opposition must recognize that legitimacy cannot be outsourced, and sovereignty is not negotiable. No amount of external patronage will grant durable power if they refuse to reconcile with the people they claim to represent. Only through accountability, humility, and a demonstrable break from their past can they hope to re-enter Armenia’s political future as a force for good.
Until then, their aspirations will remain hollow, while the Armenian people continue building a society where dignity, accountability, and independence are not bargaining chips but the non-negotiable foundations of the nation’s future.
References
- Broers, M. (2014). Napoleon: Soldier of Destiny. Faber & Faber.
- Hale, H. E. (2015). Patronal Politics: Eurasian Regime Dynamics in Comparative Perspective. Cambridge University Press.
- Kinzer, S. (2003). All the Shah’s Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror. Wiley.
- Levitsky, S., & Ziblatt, D. (2018). How Democracies Die. Crown.
- Nichol, J. (2011). Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Political Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests. Congressional Research Service.
- OSCE/ODIHR. (2008). Republic of Armenia Presidential Election, 19 February 2008: Final Report.
- Tucker, J. A., Theocharis, Y., Roberts, M. E., & Barberá, P. (2017). “From Liberation to Turmoil: Social Media and Democracy,” Journal of Democracy, 28(4), 46–59.