Below is an English version of the recent interview with Armina G. Margaryan, the WGSA Founder & President, on armtimes.com: https://www.armtimes.com/hy/article/294420
– We witnessed the information “warfare” during and after Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to Baku. First, official Baku spread a number of disinformation related to the armed forces of Armenia, then statements from Moscow, particularly, Sergey Lavrov’s statement that “Yerevan is sabotaging the agreement on communications.” Followed. What does all this mean and why did Putin visit Azerbaijan?
I would say that this information “warfare” did not start at that very moment, but has gained a new momentum, since for a long time the Russian side has been publicly accusing Armenia of non-compliance with paragraph 9 of the November 9 trilateral statement. Meanwhile, it is difficult to find even one provision of this statement that would not be violated by the Russian-Azerbaijani tandem itself. Today, the inter-state relations between these two are exemplary in their strategic alliance nature, and there are objective reasons for this. These relations are primarily based on the policy of anti-Western regionalization. Both seek to prevent Western engagement in regional issues, since both are vulnerable in terms of complying with the principles of the rules-based international order. In other words, Russian-Azerbaijani allied interaction is anchored in the fact that their national security interests are shaped and promoted within the framework of the threat or use of force, unlawful acts, coercive and aggressive policies. Armenia, weakened by the second Artsakh war, is not only courageously pursuing its democratic path, but also resisting their plans. The Russian-Azerbaijani behind-the-scenes agreement on obtaining an extraterritorial corridor through the sovereign territory of Armenia under the guise of the November 9 trilateral statement is one of the plans. Its realization will enable Russia to bypass Western economic and political sanctions, while also granting a leverage to Azerbaijan to become a regional sub-hegemon with all the negative consequences for Armenia in terms of prospects for unblocking Armenia, diminishing economic dependence on Russia, pursuing a full-fledged sovereign foreign policy and building resilience.
– Is the Russian-Azerbaijani current activation related to the removal of the provision of regional communications from the draft peace agreement?
It is. While the Armenian side quickly labeled this decision as a result of the Armenian-Azerbaijani agreement, in fact it was a continuation of the plan of the Russian-Azerbaijani alliance to obtain the so-called “Zangezur corridor” from Armenia. Russians and Azerbaijanis work in a very synchronous manner, regularly exchanging roles. Azerbaijan successfully “sells” the agreement on removal of the provision of regional communications from the draft peace agreement to the West as an example of constructivism and concessions on its part in the process of normalization between Armenia and Azerbaijan, while Russia simultaneously activates bilateral economic and political pressure on Armenia.
In fact, with a different set of tools, they both achieve the same result. The current Russian-Azerbaijani activation may create serious problems for Armenia strategically, since removing the provision of regional communications from the draft peace agreement may actually exclude it from the Western agenda, while the Russian – Azerbaijani plan on the so-called “Zangezur corridor” not only remains relevant but is also complemented by the imposition of Russian economic “sanctions” against Armenia. Consequently, the process of building Armenia’s resilience will become more complicated and on the other hand, the anti-Armenian component of the Russian-Azeri alliance will deepen even more.
– Does “finding” problems in 90% of the Armenian Cognac by Moscow have any relevance to political developments? Are we subject to economic sanctions, and what’s next?
Economic sanctions are one of the most important tools of implementing Russia’s foreign policy. Let’s recall the Russia – Belarus “milk war” of 2009 or periodic conflicts over the import of Georgian wine and Borjomi. The developments around Armenian fruits, vegetables and cognac should be seen in terms of the role assigned to Russia as a result of the distribution of roles between Russia and Azerbaijan.
– Will the Russian – Azeri alliance resort to new provocations or military escalation before or after COP 29? if so, what should our main activities be both in the diplomatic fora and in terms of fostering our resilience and increasing combat capability?
I do not see any conditions for new provocations until the COP 29, but the policy of threat of force against Armenia will continue, acquiring new tools – economic, energy, psychological, etc. Our number one task is to accelerate the systemic reforms in the Armed Forces, work towards economic diversification and give a new impetus to democratic reforms in various fields. All three will contribute to increasing our resilience, strengthening the social contract and inclusive policy making.
– Does the fact that Armenia is not leaving the CSTO help or do more harm? In case of withdrawal from the Organization, what, in your opinion, will be the alternative for Armenia?
The more the Armenia – Russia interstate relations deteriorate, the vaguer the prospects for Armenia’s withdrawal from the CSTO become. I have repeatedly stressed that leaving the CSTO is a multi-layered combination, and not additionally irritating Russians publicly is one of the components of this combination. While Armenia is trying to calculate the risks of leaving the CSTO, staying in the CSTO further increases the risks of leaving it in the future.
– Do the statements about the absence of alternative for Armenia to the CSTO speak about the fears of the Russian authorities, namely that Armenia can make drastic decisions, or are these statements a manifestation of keeping Armenia in fear and threat?
In fact, the Russian side really believes that Armenia has no alternative to CSTO. When the CSTO issue in Armenian-Russian relations took a very negative turn, our first task was to convince Russia that the political decision on leaving the CSTO does not mean seeking an alternative to the CSTO but aims at ensuring “non-block status” for Armenia. It is obvious that the Russians would not accept our decision with open arms, but it would at least serve a base for Armenia’s tactical maneuvers and, if possible, deprive Russia of the legitimacy of an open anti-Armenian policy. At the end of the day, we would be able to justify our decision, among other reasons, precisely from the point of view of revising Armenian-Russian relations for the sake of restoring these relations. And this revision process could have taken years, which we would also use to develop our security systems and build resilience. It is worrying that the deepening Armenian-Russian interstate crisis may complicate the very process of developing our security systems and building resilience.