Moscow’s Double Standards: Why Kazakhstan Has More Room for Strategic Autonomy than Armenia

Introduction

The language of geopolitical ultimatums—through which Moscow has traditionally sought to dictate the foreign policy orientation of post-Soviet states—is applied selectively. This reality becomes particularly evident when comparing Russia’s approach towards Kazakhstan and Armenia, two members of both the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).

Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s recent visit to Brussels, his meetings with European Union leaders, and his participation in the Kazakhstan–Europe Business Forum once again underscored Astana’s commitment to pursuing an independent and sovereign foreign policy. Kazakhstan presented Europe with a pragmatic proposition: access to Kazakh resources in exchange for European technology, investment, and the establishment of joint production capacities. Through this approach, Astana has consistently expanded its cooperation with the West while simultaneously maintaining its membership in Russian-led institutions. Notably, this course has not provoked a harsh reaction from the Kremlin.

By contrast, Russia has responded with open hostility to virtually every step Armenia has taken toward diversifying its foreign relations, repeatedly demanding that Yerevan “clarify its geopolitical orientation.” This naturally raises an obvious question: if Moscow expects Armenia to “choose a side,” why does it not make the same demand of Kazakhstan? After all, both countries belong to the same Russian-led integration frameworks, yet Kazakhstan openly continues to deepen its ties with the European Union and the broader collective West.

Moreover, the deepening Astana–Brussels partnership is, from the perspective of Russia’s strategic interests, far more consequential than the current trajectory of Armenia–EU relations.

If Armenia’s European agenda is primarily centred on political dialogue, democratic institutional reform, security cooperation, economic resilience, and regional connectivity, Kazakhstan’s engagement with the European Union concerns a partner of far greater strategic and economic significance. Kazakhstan is a major supplier of oil, natural gas, uranium, and other critical raw materials to Europe, while also serving as a key hub of the Middle Corridor.

Strategic Weight and Critical Dependencies

Today, Kazakhstan has emerged as one of the few countries capable of supplying Europe with resources that have traditionally fallen within Russia’s sphere of dominance. The figures speak for themselves: Kazakhstan accounts for approximately 13 percent of the European Union’s crude oil imports and around 16 percent of its natural uranium imports, objectively reducing Russia’s significance in European markets and supply chains. Step by step, Kazakhstan is occupying strategic economic positions once dominated by Russia—in rare earth and critical minerals, grain exports, energy supplies, and Eurasian transport corridors. It is therefore no coincidence that the Astana–Brussels partnership represents a far more tangible and strategic challenge to Moscow than Armenia’s political rapprochement with the European Union.

Moreover, Kazakhstan’s importance to Russia stems from its institutional and economic weight. After Russia, Kazakhstan is the second-largest economy in the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). Its GDP is more than ten times larger than Armenia’s, while its population exceeds Armenia’s by roughly sixfold. As a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) sharing one of the world’s longest continuous land borders with Russia, Kazakhstan occupies a pivotal position not only within the EAEU’s economic architecture but also in Russia’s broader regional security and logistics system.

Should Astana decide to withdraw from both the EAEU and the CSTO, the viability—and potentially even the very survival—of these organisations would be placed in serious doubt. This is precisely why Moscow is compelled to pursue a far more cautious approach towards Kazakhstan.

Furthermore, unlike Armenia, Kazakhstan benefits from the powerful geopolitical backing of China. Beijing has consistently signalled its commitment to safeguarding the sovereignty of the Central Asian states, forcing Moscow to exercise considerably greater restraint in its dealings with Astana.

Imperial Ambitions in the Caucasus and Hybrid Levers of Influence

In Armenia’s case, the picture is fundamentally different. Although Armenia’s strategic importance has grown in recent years, and the South Caucasus is increasingly viewed as a critical link in the Middle Corridor connecting Central Asia to Europe, Yerevan still lacks Kazakhstan’s economic weight and freedom of action.

Russia’s markedly different—and far tougher—approach towards Armenia can be explained by Moscow’s continued reluctance to abandon its imperial ambitions to keep the country within its sphere of influence. The Kremlin understands that once it loses its remaining levers of influence in Armenia, it risks losing the South Caucasus altogether and, as a result, its ability to project influence into Central Asia.

It is no coincidence that some Russian experts have compared the opening of regional transport routes—and TRIPP (the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity) in particular—to the Strait of Hormuz in terms of strategic importance. They argue that losing control over this route would ultimately lead to the complete loss of Russian influence over Central Asia.

Despite Yerevan’s efforts to diversify its foreign policy, Russia continues to view Armenia not as a fully sovereign partner but as part of its own sphere of influence. This perception became particularly evident against the backdrop of interference documented during Armenia’s most recent parliamentary elections, when international and local investigations, including reports by Reuters and The Insider, exposed attempts to exert Russian information and hybrid influence.

Russian state television channels available on Armenia’s public broadcasting multiplex openly supported pro-Russian political actors for months, while portraying the incumbent authorities in an overwhelmingly negative light. This clearly demonstrates that Moscow views Armenia’s electoral processes not as a democratic institution, but as a political arena for preserving its own influence.

In this context, an episode during Nikol Pashinyan’s working visit to Moscow on April 1 this year is particularly noteworthy. During his meeting with Vladimir Putin, the Russian president called for the release from detention of pro-Russian figures in Armenia who hold Russian citizenship and for them to be allowed to participate in the country’s domestic political processes. The demand was a clear manifestation of Moscow’s determination to preserve its levers of influence in Armenia.

In effect, the Russian president made clear that the Kremlin continues to regard Armenia as a space where a Russian passport is presumed to confer privileged status. In keeping with the most entrenched traditions of imperial thinking, Moscow appears to believe that Armenia’s law enforcement and judicial institutions should take into account not the laws of the Republic of Armenia, but Russia’s political preferences.

This is not the language of lawful relations or partnership between sovereign states. It is the language of spheres of influence, imperial peripheries, and Great Russian imperial thinking. Once again, it demonstrates that Russia has yet to come to terms with the reality of Armenia as an independent state.

The Clash Between Public Aspirations and Imperial Perceptions

Unlike in Kazakhstan, Russia’s principal levers of influence over Armenia—beyond the economic and military spheres—are primarily political, informational, and societal. For years, Moscow has sought to preserve its influence through pro-Russian political, media, and economic networks operating in Armenia, as well as by exploiting the vulnerabilities and dependencies of the Armenian community in Russia as a means of political pressure.

However, Armenia’s 2026 parliamentary elections demonstrated that this logic is increasingly colliding with a new political reality. Despite attempts at external interference, information campaigns, and the considerable resources invested by pro-Russian forces, the majority of Armenian citizens did not support pro-Russian political actors.

Moreover, public opinion surveys conducted in recent years indicate that a majority of Armenian citizens support the diversification of the country’s foreign policy, deeper relations with Europe, and a gradual move away from the logic of relying on a “single security guarantor.” This does not imply a public demand to sever relations with Russia. Rather, it means that Armenian citizens no longer want their country’s future to be tied to any single centre of power.

At the heart of the problem lies a conceptual divide between Moscow and Yerevan: the Kremlin’s ambition to view Armenia as a compliant satellite is no longer compatible with Armenian society’s aspiration to live in a sovereign state.

In this context, one cannot overlook the distinctive paradox of the diaspora factor that emerges from a comparison between Kazakhstan and Armenia. Unlike Armenia, Kazakhstan has a Russian community numbering in the millions. Yet Moscow has been unable to transform this population into a classic “fifth column” or use it against Astana to generate domestic destabilisation. Astana’s balanced domestic policy and effective state oversight have made this risk largely manageable.

The situation in Armenia is markedly different. Driven by its geopolitical interests, Moscow has successfully instrumentalised the media, economic, and political elites of the Armenian community in Russia against Yerevan. A striking example is the active involvement of Samvel Karapetyan, a prominent businessman and representative of Russia’s Armenian community, in Armenia’s domestic political processes, as well as efforts to shape the country’s domestic political agenda.

Thus, while Kazakhstan’s large ethnic Russian population has failed to become a reliable instrument of Kremlin pressure against Astana, in Armenia’s case Moscow has successfully transformed the Armenian community and financial resources based in Russia into an effective tool of domestic influence and interference.

Armenia’s Path to Strategic Freedom

For Moscow to ultimately recognise Armenia’s sovereignty and independence, and for bilateral relations to make a fundamental shift towards a partnership based on mutual respect, Yerevan must fundamentally reduce its critical dependencies on Russia and increase its own strategic weight.

In this regard, diversifying Armenia’s economic and energy ties is of paramount importance, as the country’s dependence on Russian gas, nuclear fuel, and grain remains one of its principal vulnerabilities. Armenia should expand its energy ties with regional actors to the greatest extent possible, particularly with Turkmenistan and, if an agreement is reached with Washington, also with Iran. In parallel, the country must invest in renewable energy and actively seek alternative sources of grain and other essential goods in the Black Sea region and Central Asia.

Alongside these economic measures, Armenia must capitalise on its geographic position in the context of emerging regional transport projects and the opening of regional communications. Transforming the country, in line with the logic of the Crossroads of Peace initiative, into an indispensable international trade hub connecting Central Asia and the Persian Gulf with Europe would create an environment in which the world’s major powers have a direct stake in Armenia’s security and stability. This, in turn, would serve as a natural deterrent against external pressure and aggression.

At the same time, Armenia must safeguard its informational and institutional sovereignty. This entails removing from the public multiplex foreign television channels involved in hybrid campaigns and the dissemination of disinformation, strengthening cybersecurity, and gradually reducing the state administration’s dependence on Russian technological platforms—including transport and logistics ecosystems, financial accounting platforms, and cyber defence systems.

These measures should be reinforced by the practical expansion of Armenia’s security alternatives. The deepening of military-technical cooperation with France, India, the United States, and other European partners is already significantly eroding Moscow’s monopoly on the political capital it has long derived from its position as Armenia’s “sole security guarantor.”

The difference in Moscow’s approach towards Kazakhstan and Armenia is not driven by sympathy or antipathy. It stems from a cold calculation of the balance of power. States that pursue a multi-vector foreign policy and have alternative allies are treated by Russia as actors whose interests cannot simply be ignored. Those that remain critically dependent on Russia, by contrast, continue to be viewed as part of its sphere of influence.

Armenia’s strategic objective, therefore, is not to confront Russia, but to build a state against which coercive pressure becomes ineffective and prohibitively costly. Only then can bilateral relations move away from the logic of unilateral influence and towards a partnership based on mutual respect.

Author: Elen Hokhikyan

This version of the article was translated from the original Armenian with the assistance of artificial intelligence (AI) tools.

This article was prepared with the support of the Democracy Development Foundation. The content of this publication is the sole responsibility of the Women and Global Security Architecture (WGSA) Think Tank and does not necessarily reflect the official views of the Democracy Development Foundation.